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Until now, the dominant belief concerning the relationship between poverty and risk aversion is that 
the poor are more risk averse. If the poor are more risk averse, then they will choose “low risk–low 
return” activities that trap them in poverty. However, both empirical and experimental evidence 
show no clear pattern such as would suggest that the poor are somehowmore averse to risk than 
others; at times, they even seem to embrace risk, while at other times, there seems to be no 
difference. Focus has tended to be on extreme behaviors, as these are related to sub-optimal 
decisions such as have even raised questions whether an individual can be simultaneously both poor 
and rational. Amongst all the available empirical evidence, there is one bit of evidence of special 
interest—changes in behavior whenever subsistence is at risk. This paper emerges from the fact that 
recent experimental evidence in both psychology and economics suggests that certain decisions 
made under risk respond to reference points.We develop a theory within the traditional streamof 
rational choices, whereby the references are set by only observable variables, such as prices and 
family size.  According to this theory, extremely poor individuals respond to the income reference 
that guarantees the consumption of the necessary calories so as to ensure a healthy and longer life. 
Being in the neighborhood of this reference can incentivize both the seeking of high risk, whenever 
below the reference, and an aversion to high risk, when above. An experimental exercise was 
conducted involving 92 individuals from households living in poverty and extreme poverty wherein 
they participated in a baseline risk experiment that was the one we analyzed.Inasmuch as the 
treatment was not randomly assigned, but instead was determined based on households’ per-capita 
incomes, a quasi-experimental approach was used to analyze the results. We use a regression 
discontinuity design, andfind evidence suggesting that being presented with the opportunity of 
avoiding undernourishmentsignificantly decreases a household’s risk aversion.  
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PREFERENCIAS SOBRE EL RIESGO BAJO EXTREMA 





Hastahoy, la creencia dominante acerca de la relación entre la pobreza y la aversión al riesgo es que 
los pobres son más aversos al riesgo que el resto. Si esto es cierto entonces los pobres se van a 
quedar escogiendo actividades de “bajo riesgo – bajo retorno” lo que los atrapa en la pobreza. Sin 
embargo, la evidencia experimental y empírica no muestra un patrón claro ya que los pobres a veces 
son más aversos al riesgo, a veces menos, y otras veces no parece haber relación alguna. Sin 
embargo, entretoda la evidencia disponible hay una de interés especial y es que el comportamiento 
parece cambiar cuando la subsistencia se encuentra en juego. Este documento emerge de la 
evidencia que, desde la economía y la sicología, sugiere que algunos comportamientos bajo riesgo 
responden a referencias. Se desarrolla una teoría, dentro de la línea de decisiones racionales en el 
que las referencias son determinadas por variables observables. En esta teoría, quienes viven bajo la 
pobreza extrema van a responder a la referencia del ingreso que les asegura el consumo de un 
mínimo de calorías para llevar una vida sana y larga. Cuando se está cerca de la línea de pobreza se 
pueden incentivar: el gusto por el riesgo si se encuentra por debajo, o la aversión al riesgo cuando se 
encuentra por encima. Se llevó a cabo un experimento en campo, con tres ejercicios experimentales 
en los que participaron 92 individuos que viven bajo condiciones de pobreza y pobreza extrema, de 
los cuales analizamos el ejercicio de riesgo base. En este caso, debido a que el tratamiento no era 
asignado de manera aleatoria sino por el ingreso per-cápita de los hogares de los individuos, se hizo 
uso de técnicas cuasi-experimentales. Mediante el análisis de regresión discontinua se encuentra 
evidencia que sugiere que individuos en estado de malnutrición,ante una oportunidad de evadirla, 
aumentan significativamente su gusto por el riego. 
 
 
Palabras Clave: aversión al riesgo, pobreza, regresión discontinua. 
Clasificación JEL: C93, D81, D91, I30.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION. 
 “[f]aced with the choice between enjoying leisure now and 
starving later or investing time in a risky activity such as 
crop production, risk averse households naturally choose to 
take risks and produce.” Fafchamps (1999) 
 
The dominant belief remains, even until now, that the poor
1 are different from the rest of 
the population in several aspects including, in terms of risk aversion—that is, that they are 
more risk averse than the rest of society, even to the point where they have been labeled as 
extremely risk averse. If the poor are extremely averse to risk, they will choose low-
risk/low-return activities such as keep them in a poverty trap. However, the empirical and 
experimental evidence on the subject shows no clear pattern in this respect. While the poor 
are indeed sometimes extremely averse to risk, at other times, they are extreme risk lovers; 
at other times, the fact of their being poor seems to make no difference. Even if there are 
differences between the decisions made by the poor and those made by other individuals, is 
this a manifestation of their irrationality or a rational response to incentives unique to them? 
Two possible answers lead to different understandings of poverty and, correspondingly, 
different strategies for confronting and fighting it.  
 
As cited by Cardenas and Carpenter (2008), Irving Fish stated in 1930 that “[a] small 
income, other things being equal, tends to produce a high rate of impatience, partly from 
the thought that provision for the present is necessary both for the present itself and for the 
future as well and partly from lack of foresight and self-control.” This commonly held 
belief implies that, somehow, the rationality of the poor is not consistent with economic 
growth and development; furthermore, that their situation is, at least partly, a consequence 
of their irrational choices. Understanding poverty in such a manner has consequences in the 
formulation of government policies aimed at and societal attitudes towards the poor. As this 
has been the dominant understanding of poverty for over 70 years, the fight on poverty has 
focused on redistribution strategies from the “productive and rational” non-poor to the 
                                                 
1Various definitions of poverty exist. For example, Senlinks poverty to a state where one has no liberty, while 
Adam Smith defines it as living with shame. This paper however uses the widely used definition of poverty as 
living below an income poverty line. Extreme poverty refers to a state where an individual or household 
cannot afford to buy a basket of food such as would provide the minimum consumption of calories.  
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“irrational” poor. This belief is still strong. For example, Tanaka et al. (2008) state that “[i]f 
people are extremely averse to financial risk, they may be reluctant to create businesses that 
may have inherently risky cash flows. If people are impatient, they may be reluctant to 
invest and educate their children. Taken together, risk-aversion and impatience may 
explain, in part, why some people remain poor.”  
Nevertheless, it has to be acknowledged that the risky situation confronting the poor may 
affect their decision process. Duflo (2003) states that “[m]odern development economics 
emerged with the realization that poverty changes these of options available to individuals. 
Poverty thus affects behavior, even if the decisionmaker is ‘neo-classical’.” 
Having said all that, could it be the case that the economic rationality of the poor differs 
from that of the non-poor? And if so, what happens when the poor transition to being non-
poor. Will their rationality change? Duflo (2003) emphasizes that, regarding poverty, 
“[w]hat is needed is a theory of how poverty influences decision-making, not only 
byaffecting the constraints, but by changing the decision-making process itself.” 
 
Discussion over the rationality of the poor and how their situation bounds their choices has 
been enriched by a growing number of empirical studies. The empirical literature on risk 
aversion and poverty provides evidence that somehow seems contradictory. Nonetheless, 
one particular piece of evidence is of special interest, as it sheds light on the solution on 
what appears to be contradictory behavior—it suggests that “behavior changes whenever 
subsistence is at risk.” This would suggest that whether or not subsistence is at stake can 
generate incentives leading to higher or lower risk aversion. If this is the case, it could 
mean that many of the types of risk-related behaviors documented with respect to the poor 
may reveal, not “inherent preferences” over risk, but rather what might be termed “revealed 
incentivized preferences.”  
In this matter, Arrow states that“[i]n particular, one of the most powerful constraints on an 
individual’s freedom of action and choice is the size of his budget. His income determines 
his freedom to choose his consumption matter or to shift to jobs that are pleasanter or more 
rewarding personally. The price system does not provide within itself any defensible 
income distribution. In fact, the price system tends to obscure the fact that low income is a  
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restriction on freedom. In such way, the average consumer is apt to ignore the fundamental 
restriction on the consumer’s opportunities implied by poverty”
2 
 
This paper develops a theory of referenced preferences for the extremely poor such as 
generates “revealed incentivized preferences.” It proposes a value function with jumps that, 
in contrast with other proposed theories, allows us to expect certain types of social 
behavior, inasmuch as the subsistence reference is common to most of households
3. The 
proposed value function is able to reconcile the two types of behavior documented for the 
poor—those of “income smoothing”
4 and “risk loving.”
5An economic experiment in the 
fieldis carried out in order to test this reference for the extremely poor and provides 
evidence suggestive that the poor respond to the reference; moreover, that one’s position 
vis-à-vis the reference affects one’s behavior with respect to and attitude towards risk. 
 
Theremainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents some of the 
literature on the theory of risk aversion; section III presents empirical and experimental 
evidence on poverty and risk aversion; section IV develops the theoretical model of the 
value function with jumps and the incentivized preferences; section V presents the actual 
experiment and an econometric analysis of it; and section VI provides concluding remarks. 
   
                                                 
2Arrow (1985). 
3Certain situations may affect the value of the reference inasmuch as they add pressure to the budget such as 
having one or more household members in transitory or permanent health distress. 
4 Murdoch (1995) finds that the poor seem to follow a strategy of “income smoothing” instead of the more 
common strategy of “consumption smoothing.” He notes that because the poor are more vulnerable to adverse 
shocks, they will choose activities with lower returns but lower risks, thus minimizing their exposure to 
downward results. 
5 Banerjee and Duflo (2006) shows that effectively, a great proportion of the poor and the extremely poor 
choose to undertake risky activities such as that of entrepreneur. However, when they undertake such 
enterprises, they do it on a non-optimal scale, and with a very low probability of success. This is due to their 
lack of access to credit (loans) as well as probable psychological issues related to be doing something they 
otherwise would not do.  
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II.  THEORETICAL REVIEW 
Even though the concept of economic risk has appeared in the literature since the 
eighteenth century, it was only in 1944, when Von Neumann and Morgenstern (hereafter, 
VNM) defined EU, that it could for the first time be defined in an abstract manner. In 1948, 
Friedman and Savage complemented the work of VNM, defining for the first time the taste 
for or aversion towards risk. In addition to the widely known and widely used concave 
utility function, their paper opened the possibility of utility functions with multiple 
inflection points (see Figure 1). If this were valid, they claimed that their theory could 
explain why there are households that simultaneously play lotteries and take out insurance. 
However, Markowitz (1952) argued that an S-shaped utility function would also mean that 
rich households near the inflection point would not take out insurance against large losses 
with a low probability of occurrence, and that they would never accept a fair game; 
nonetheless, the concept of risk aversion remained. Instead, he proposed a utility curve with 
three inflection points (see Figure 2), where the second one is the “customary” wealth that, 
in most cases, coincides with current wealth. He expected that, for the poor, the first and 
third inflection points would be closer to the customary wealth than for middle-class 
individuals; for the rich, the inflection points would be further apart. Pratt (1964) widened 
the classical theory of risk by including the concept of risk prime. Still, almost as long as 
EU has existed, there has been evidence that some behaviors cannot be explained by it. 
These types of behavior have been defined as paradoxes and the persistence of such 
paradoxes has raised the necessity of complementing or reconsidering EU. 
 
On the one hand, one important feature of the classical theories is that, because they deal 
with one-time and immediate payments, the utility of the payments is received 
instantaneously, and they have no impact in the future. However, some decisions entail the 
realization of risk in the future; even if the realization of risk is immediate, we can imagine 
payments large enough such that they will likely also have consequences in the future—for 
example, lotteries. In these cases, with one-time immediate payment risks then, neglecting 
the possibility that the one-time payment will have consequences in the future could 
amount to leaving out one of its fundamental features. One alternative would be to include 
several periods in our analysis. For this purpose, we might use the well-developed theory of  
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discounted utility (hereafter, DU). This theory was initially proposed by Samuelson 
(1937),but has sincegenerated various strands.
6 An example of the classic DU can be found 
in Sandmo (1970), who studied the case for two periods.In these early models, the way to 
discount was through a time-invariant discount rate. However, even after DU was included, 
some analogous paradoxes to those of EU became manifest, as presented by Lowenstein 
and Prelec (1992). In this field, behavioral economics, with its hyperbolic and quasi-
hyperbolic discount rates, has again defined the approach best suited to the data and 
explaining the anomalies present in the standard discount rate.
7 When time is introduced 
into the evaluation frame, the same question arises as when looking at the explanation 
offered by the orthodoxy, that the poor have higher discount rates.
8 Why would the poor 
differ from the non-poor? Moreover, if this is the case, we would expect that a household 
formally poor (during the previous period) but poor no longer (during the present period) 
would change its discount rate so as to adapt to the changed situation.  
 
On the other hand, reference dependence is a behavior that has been frequently observed. 
Reference dependence refers to when behavior is influenced by some reference, for 
instance, the present endowment (status quo) or aspirational levels (self-induced 
objectives). On the basis of this, Masatioglu and Uler (2007) shows thatEU theory is a 
weak one, explaining roughly 50% of the variability against the 70-75% explained by other 
theories that take into account for references such as Kahneman and Tversky’s Prospect 
Theory (1979, see Figure 3) (hereafter, PT) and their subsequent (and improved) 
Cumulative Prospect Theory (1991) (hereafter, CPT), or modified classical theory (as per 
Masatioglu and Ok, 2006) whereinthe existence of references are accounted for in the 
decision-making process. 
 
Given that, as has been remarked by Rabin and Thaler (2001), standard EU theory has been 
insufficient to explain a wide range of behaviors, various alternatives have been proposed; 
standing out among these are PT and CPT. Wu, Zhang and Gonzales (2004) note that, in 
                                                 
6For a very good summary of DU theories, see Frederick et al. (2002). 
7Actually, “the first suggestion of other ways to discount was made by an economist,Strotz.”(Frederick et 
al,2002, p. 8). More recent papers on this approach come from the area of behavioral economics. 
8 Nielsen 2001.  
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their seminal paper on PT, Khaneman and Tversky “presented convincing empirical 
demonstrations that highlighted some general descriptive deficiencies with expected utility, 
as well as a powerful formal theory for organizing these demonstrations…[they 
accomplished this with] an unique combination of simplicity and depth.” Those following 
this theory have taken as their usual reference points, the statusquo, the lagged status quo, 
and the mean of a chosen lottery,
9 as well as objectives established by the households 
themselves.
10If a household presents its proposed utility function, being under the reference 
point or deciding over probable loses will generate risk-loving behavior; conversely, being 
higher than the reference point or deciding over feasible wins will result in risk aversion. 
PT and CPT propose a utility function that suffers a change in concavenessat the reference 
point—it is convex before the reference point and concave after it (see Figure 3). Wu et al. 
maintain that their four-fold pattern can be explained with a value function and a 
probability weighting function.The probability weighting function over-weights small 
probabilities and under-weights medium and large probabilities. Nonetheless, PT and CPT 
lack the parsimony of EU, and suffer from some “paradoxes” of its own. PT, “[i]n 
particular, permits ‘non-transitive preferences,’ which is subject to the usual ‘money-pump’ 
arguments, and ‘non-convex indifference curves,’ which often results in extreme choices 
(corner solutions)”
11 As Wu et al. (2004, p.408) remark, this “admits stochastic dominance 
and is limited to two non-zero outcomes”. 
 
Some alternatives closer to EU are the rank dependent functions,
12 as utilized by those who 
follow PT; safety first strategies,
13some of which are directly related to subsistence, for 
instance, Masson’s utility function with a jump (1974, see Figure 4);and more recently, EU 
modifications such as those carried out by Masatioglu andUler (2007) (hereafter, MU), and 
which have been able to incorporate many referenced behaviors by introducing certain 
variations such as make the reference dependency consistent with that of EU. Cox 
andSadiraj (2001) andMasagtiogluand Ok (2005) (hereafter, MO) propose, using a more 
                                                 
9Kösegui and Rabin (2007). 
10These approaches are usually based on psychological considerations, for example, the reference to 
aspirational levels, developed by Lopes (1987). 
11Masatioglu and Ok (2007). 
12See Wu et al. (2004),for a survey of choice under risk. 
13For example, Dillon and Scandizo (1978).  
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axiomatic approach, a manner by which an aversion to losses can be fitted into EU.Cox and 
Sadiraj propose imposed references, while MO establishes a status quo bias linkedto 
restricted decisions. However, their proposals lack the parsimony of EU or CPT.  
 
Anotheralternativeconsists of utility functions that remain at zero until a minimum 
point,after which the individual has a “usual” utility function, as perZuleta (2002, see 
Figure 5). This goes along with Sen’s theory (1999); he argues that the individualliving 
below the minimum so as to be free in his or her society will enter a state of depression, 
such as will make himor her indifferent to any combination of values below the 
minimum.
14  This means risk neutrality for those below the minimum. Thus, if the decision 
involves levels both above and below the minimum, then the household will be a risk lover; 
if the decision only involves levels above the minimum, then it will be risk averse.  
 
Both classical alternatives—that of MU, and the behavioral alternatives of PT and CPT—
have restrictions of their own. Some of them are not clear as to how reference points 
areestablished. Others do not solve the problem of how, if every household establishesits 
reference points independently, the respective theory helps us predict the behavior of the 
society as a whole—that is, it presents an aggregation problem as, in most cases, references 
vary between individuals and are determined by unobservable determinants. If the reference 
point is the status-quo, then why do some households, especially poor ones, chose not to 
defend their own status quo by undertaking less risky activities? Even if there is a 
consensus that standard EU is insufficient, currently there is no consensus as to which 
alternative theory best describes an individual’s behavior under risk.  
 
Finally, specifically with respect to the issues of poverty and preference reversals, the 
orthodoxy does offer some alternative explanations. The first one is that such types of 
behavior do not in fact constitute paradoxes, as the poor seem to have a different risk 
aversion than the non-poor; however, it has never been explained why the poor should be 
different; this is just an assumption made by the models.  
                                                 
14 However, in experiments conducted with individuals in poverty and extreme poverty, for options that did 
not provide the possibility of changing status, significant variability existed with respect to risk aversion. 
Some evidence can be found in the data obtained in the experiments carried out in 2007 by IADB.  
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III.  SELECTED EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
This section provides a small survey of papers suggestive of some patterns and behaviors 
relevant to poverty and risk aversion. For the sake of consistency, the remainder of the 
paper is restricted to evidence that can be directly related to income, assets or total wealth. 
On the one hand, some studies have found that the poor have a higher taste for risk—that is, 
whether in experiments, surveys or real life, there is a higher probabilitythat they will 
undertake risky activities or choices. In uncontrolled environments, they appear to choose 
to live as part of the underground economy,
15 as described by Elijah and Uffort (2007) 
andZuleta (2002),or entrepreneurship, as shown by Banerjee andDuflo(2006) (hereafter, 
BD); in controlled environments, such as in the experiments conducted by Bosch-
Domenech andBenach(2005), they take higher risks.BD, when characterizing those 
activities chosen by the poor to generate their income, arrive at the conclusion that “[i]n 
several ways, the poor are trading offopportunities to have higher incomes.” They also 
show that many poor households are involved in high-risk activities, especially those 
related to entrepreneurship. Finally, they find that, simultaneously, even in the rural sector, 
specialization is not common, nor do the poor diversify their sources of income so as to be 
able to mitigate the risks of idiosyncratic shocks to the activities in which they engage. 
Diversification, in this case, increases the expected value of gains, but also decreases the 
probability of exceptionally high gains. Lack of diversification then can be understood as a 
risky choice, likely chosen because it opens up the possibility of covering the minimums. 
 
On the other hand, some studies have found that the poor choose less risky activities, 
andfollow strategies such as income smoothing, as proposed by Morduch(1995). These 
types of behavior are also described by Tanaka et al (2008). It should be noted that other 




                                                 
15They define underground economy as one wherein the “[a]gents engaged in underground/informal 
activitiescircumvent, escape, or are excluded from the institutional system of rules, rights, regulations, 
andenforcement penalties that govern formal agents… we can identifyfour specific types of “underground” 
economic activity: illegal, unreported, unrecorded, and informal.” (Elijah and Uffort (2007), p. 4) 
16Other papers which have found no difference are cited by Tanaka et al (2008) in the references.  
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Additionally, certain preference reversals have been associated with income and changes in 
the size of stakes, such as has been documented by Bosch-Domenech and Benach (2005). 
They find that, on average, participants that are wealthier tend to risk more when the stakes 
are low, but that this pattern does not hold for large sums. This reversal could beexpected 
when the new size of the stake includes a reference not included up till that moment. 
Because the poor’s references are closer to their endowed income, preference reversals will 
first appear with them.  
 
Finally, and specifically related to the matter of subsistence, Dillon and Scandizzo (1978) 
found that whenever subsistence is at stake—and where there is a possibility of getting 
payments lower than those that will assure the minimum—risk aversion increases, 
whenever possible payments decrease. However, once subsistence is assured, risk aversion 
decreases. 
IV.  THEORETICAL ANALYSIS: THE VALUE FUNCTION WITH JUMPS 
Traditionally, the analysis of decisions under risk has depended on the number of periods 
involved with respect to the decision in question: if the decision is made only once and the 
consequent risk is immediately realized, then the analysis is restricted to a single period; if, 
on the other hand, the decision is realized over more than one period, then the frame being 
used will include several periods of time. The respective logic, even though it seems quite 
obvious, is not always correct. This is because the realization of risk for a one time decision 
can have repercussions or consequences in the future. Let us imagine that one is presented 
with a game that has only two options: either one takes one million dollars (the one million 
is guaranteed) or, depending of the toss of a coin, receives either zero or five million 
dollars, with equal probability. The decision is taken only once, and the resultant gains are 
experienced immediately. Yet, even if this game is only played once, the outcome will most 
likely have consequences in the future; it seems then that the question of how many periods 
we should include in our analysis depends not only on the number of periods inclusive of 
the actual decision, but also of those reflective of the size of the gain.  
 
The theoretical construction of the model is developed in two complementary parts. First, 
we explain how to identify the income reference related to subsistence. Second,we explain  
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how this reference is expected to modify the behavior of those deciding on change based on 
the reference. The model of a value function with a jump is constructed for a discrete 
period of time. For every period, a household makes choices that may, or may not, affect its 
members’ collective life expectancy. Whenever today’s decisions have a potential impact 
on their life expectancy, changes in risk aversion will be expected. 
A.  Where can we expect the jump?—the minimum consumption of calories to 
ensure a healthy and longer life. 
There are four nutritional states related to the consumption of food: starvation, daily 
undernourishment, properly nourished and obesity.  
Starvation defines the situation wherein the consumption of calories is extremely low or 
null. This state can rapidly lead to death, even though in most cases, death will actually be a 
result of a different disease brought on by starvation.
17 As the losses in life expectancy for 
this state accrue in time, the incentive for leaving this state is very high.  
Daily undernourishment constitutes the most common scenario for poor households in 
developing countries; essentially, it means not receiving the minimum consumption of 
calories and vitamins necessary for a healthy life. The effects of this state are not restricted 
to lower life expectancy, but also include general weakness (such as might result in being 
excluded from a physical job) and mental slowness (which may translate into difficulties 
with learning and understanding).
18 
In a market society, in order to obtain food as well as other basic goods and services, 
households have to pay a price. If their income is very low, then they won’t be able to 
achieve the minimum consumption of calories. If that minimum is not achieved, then all the 
consequences related to the state of undernourishment will be incurred, among them, lower 
life expectancy. Based on this, the income needed to buy the minimum amount of food 
required to have a healthy life is the most immediate reference for the extremely poor.  
                                                 
17A full description of the starvation process can be found inVan de Graaf, K. and Fox, S. (2001). Concepts of 
Human Anatomy and Physiology,fifth edition. 
18“Daily undernourishment is a less visible form of hunger. For weeks, even months, its victims must live on 
significantly less than the recommended 2,100 calories that the average person needs to lead a healthy life. 
The body compensates for the lack of energy by slowing down its physical and mental activities. Hunger also 
weakens the immune system. Deprived of the right nutrition, hungry children are especially vulnerable and 
become too weak to fight off disease and may die from common infections like measles and diarrhoea.” The 
World Food Programme (WFP).  
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Banerjee and Duflo (2007) find sufficient evidence to assure that “[t]he poor, and 
particularly the extremely poor, have a lower chance of survivalthan those who are 
somewhat more well-off.” More emphatically, “[o]n balance, [they] are tempted to interpret 
the evidence accumulated asrevealing, at least in part, that poverty does kill.”  
The short-term effects are not so easily identifiable, as they are a consequence of mental or 
physical weakness; exclusion based on the perception of risk of theft is not very likely, but 
the incentive of hunger persists. Over the long run, under this state, identifiable physical 
and mental characteristics arise. All these characteristics are easily perceived by other 
persons or groups of people, most likely addingexclusion to the consequences of being 
undernourished. Because early childhood is the period when the body builds up, the future 
effects of persistent hunger or starvation in terms of possible exclusion are higher, making 
this age critical. Persistent undernourishment generates invariable characteristics that over 
the long run that can generate exclusion—among these are stunting (low height for one’s 
age), wasting (low weight for one’s age) and being underweight. 
B.  How is behavior influenced by the income reference? 
First, we construct the value function with jumps andwe then develop a decision model that 
takes into account the existence of the jumps. 
To model the proposed theory, we use forward-looking households that maximize value 
functions. These functions can be considered an extension of DU. The value function is one 
that discounts the instantaneous utility obtained by optimal decisions made in the future, 
and adds the utility obtained during the present period. This extension remains in line with 
the theory of DU, as we don’t need to deviate from a single discount rate.
19 
 
We take our point of departure as an individual that maximizes the sum of the expected 
utility derived from consumption during the present period and the discounted value of 
future instantaneous utilities obtained through future consumptions. The risk preferences 
derived from the utility gained by present consumption is here called “inherent 
preferences.” Future instantaneous utilities are those obtained under optimal decisions with 
respect to the future. Because we focus on the poor and the extremely poor, we assume no 
                                                 
19“A central assumption of the DU (discounted utility) model is that all disparate motives underlying an 
intertemporal choice can be condensed into a single parameter, the discount rate.”Frederick et al. (2002).  
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access to credit markets, such that consumption is restrained by income Ct≤Mt,, where Mtis 
the total budget at time t.
20 We also assume that there are no costs of selling assets; hence, 
assets and income are perfectly convertible, with zero real returns on assets (r-π=0) and 
zero depreciation. In this manner, the budget at t,Mt, is composed of labor income for that 
period and capital is represented by Mt=wtl+Kt, where the accumulation process is 
described by Kt= Mt-1-Ct-1. 
The value function, Vt(Ct), assigns a real number to a combination of present and future 
consumptions, such that it can be defined by a cardinal relation between preferences of the 
form𝐴≼𝐵 , where A and B equals the total assets plus the gain corresponding to each 
decision.  
With decisions that do not include a reference, the value function becomes:  
[Eq. 1]  value function with no reference. 
𝑉 (𝐶 ) =            𝑈(𝐶 )           +              𝗽  ·𝑉  (𝐶 
∗)
 
     
 
                                                 [present utility]  +    [discounted future utilities], 
where T is the life expectancy and β is the discount rate. In this case, the future becomes 
irrelevant, as it can be considered a constant such that individuals behave according to EU. 
However, if thereference is contained in one of the options, the future path will depend on 
the present consumption of food. 
The resulting value function is: 
[Eq. 2]  Value function: 
extreme poverty and loss of life expectancy 
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 𝗽   ·𝑉  (𝐶 
∗) 𝑖𝑓 𝐶  <𝐶        
      
   
 
 
The references for equation 2 constitute the consumption level, however these references 
ultimately reflect income level, as income determines maximum consumption. The 
graphical representation of the resulting value function for the case of one jump can be seen 
in Figure 6. The existence of jumps on the references affects the behavior of those with 
options involving gains on both sides of the references. 
                                                 
20Including these options would only add to the complexity. Nonetheless, the intuition remains the same.  
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C.  How does the presence of the jumps affect behavior? 
First, we explain what a household’s decision procedure is: 
1)  All possibilities are evaluated to see if any results have final wealth on both sides of 
a reference.  
2)  For those having final wealth on both sides, gain or loss in the future value is added, 
taking into account the probability of that event. 
3)  With a similar evaluation of expected utility, theythen choose the option of the 
higher expected value. 
Step two is a consequence of a simplification using the following identity: 
[Identity 1] transformation of the future value 
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In the case of an extremely poor household facing two options of equal expected 
value—a riskless option with consumption below the refC and a risky option with 
probability p of finishing below the refC and a probability (1-p) of finishing above the 
riskless option—we have: 
𝐶      
      <𝐶          <𝐶           <𝐶      
        
and 
𝐶      
      <𝐶          <𝐶           <𝐶      
        
 
The preference relation is determined by calculating which option has the highest 
expect value. We therefore need to determine the following inequality: 
[ineq. 1] 
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We can now observe that the difference between EU and the value function with a jump is 
the gain in the future value, weighted by the probability of a high gain.  
If the individual is risk averse under present consumption, then  
𝑈  𝐶           >𝑝·𝑈   𝐶      
     +(1−𝑝 )𝑈  𝐶      
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If one possible decision includes the possibility of changing one’s state from 
undernourishment to nourished, then there is an incentive involved. We will then designate 
the preferences in such cases as “incentivized preferences”; these are different from 
inherent preferences. For example, in Figure 7, we find that an individual has an inherent 
preference to be risk averse and an incentivized preference to be a risk lover and the 
opposite case. 
V.  EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS 
In order to test our hypothesis, we conduct an experiment on risk decisions using 
modifications of exercises previously used in the literature. The participants represent poor 
and extremely poor households, andare expected to decide over an income reference 
reflective of the income needed to ensure the consumption of minimum calories.  
126 households were visited during the week previous to the experimental session. During 
these visits, households responded to a survey on basic socio-economic variables, and were 
invited to send one household member, of legal age, to participate in the activity. To 
maximize participation, they were told at the time of the survey that the activity could entail 
monetary gains. As this could create anticipatory effects, they were not told the size of 
those possible gains; volunteers were also instructed to come alone and bring a document to 
prove legal age. 92 household representatives participated in the experiment. Out of the 92 
surveys made, 5 of them presented missing information; consequently, the econometric 
analysis was conducted on only 87 of the participants.  
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A.  Experimental design 
One reference, proposed in this paper, is the income necessary to ensure that a household 
can buy the amount of food required to have a healthy life. Deciding over large gains, poor 
and extremely poor householdsclose to this referencewere expected to present the 
referenced behaviors predicted by the proposed theory. 
1.  Sample 
We chose the neighborhoods of Bella Flor and El Paraíso in the locality of Ciudad Bolivar 
in Bogota, as we wanted to see how being near the reference for the extremely poormight 
affect behavior. The households in these neighborhoods had a high probability of having an 
income that oscillated around the reference. In 2007, Colombia´s Bureau of Statistics 
(DANE) conducted the Life Quality Survey for Bogota, and found that the localities of 
Ciudad Bolivar and Soachasuffer the worst income conditions. Penning (2005) found that, 
in multiple respects,Bella Flor’s conditionwas precarious and worse than those of the 
locality. He also found that between 2000 and 2003,its condition was actually deteriorating, 
including with respect to the incidence of extreme poverty.Adding thislast factor to the fact 
that those neighborhoods are located in a marginal part of the city—one which combines 
rural and urban sectors—suggests that the conditions of these two neighborhoods are best 
described by the conditions of the households in the locality of Soacha. 
We approached the community through an NGO called Fundación Bella Flor
21, which had 
been in 6 years in the community as of the date of the experiments. The cooperation 
agreement achieved involved inviting all their 86 households, together with one community 
leader, to provide assistance. Additionally, we expanded the sample by randomly inviting 
22 households from each neighborhood. 
The experiment was conductedin two sessions, with 92 household members of the 128 
invited.The invitations were originally made so that we would have 63 household 
representatives at each session: 51 from the foundation for the first session, and 35 for the 
second session. Nevertheless, the sessions were run in cohorts of 49 participants for session 
1 (33 of which were from the foundation), and 37 participants for session 2 (6 of which 
were from the foundation). The treatments were not designed to depend on the sessions. 




Instead, the treatments were determined by the closeness of the households’ per-cápita 
incomes to the reference point.Once the options were given, some households could 
potentially change their position around the reference level, while other households could 
not. See Table 1 for a summary of the households’ characteristics. 
2.  Experimental exercise 
a)  Experimental setup 
Each session consisted of exercises on baserisk, loss aversion and risk pooling. The 
exercises onbase risk and loss aversion were based on those carried out by Binswager 
(1980), as implemented by the IADB in the “Experiments to Measure Trust and 
Cooperation among Latin America,” described in Candelo and Polanía (2008). Some 
variations were made in order to be able to test the proposed theory in a more accurate way. 
Eight options were presented instead of six, and the layout presented to the participants was 
modified based on the experiment by Barr and Genicot (2007), so as to make the exercise 
straightforward to participants with low education attainments. The risk pooling exercise is 
based on one of the treatments in Barr and Genicot’spaper. Here, we only present the 
results for the base risk. 
Each session lasted around 3.5 hours. A description of the location and logistic issues are 
provided in the Methodological Annex. Preliminary data for the foundation’s households 
were used to determine the value of the options such as might eventually make some of 
them choose around the reference. The options that we needed had to be sufficiently high 
so as to incentivize the referenced behavior in some households. The process also 
determined that the payments were higher than those usually used in similar experiments. 
The exercise presented the participants with eight options (in COP
22),each representing a 
bag.Each bag was filled with 10 balls, 5 with a high value and 5 with a low value (see 
Figure 8). 
If we order the bags left to right and top to bottom, bags one through seven increase in 
expected value and variability. The low value decreases by 2,000 COP from the first bag to 
the second; after that, the decreasing step increasesby 1,000 COP for the following options 
                                                 
22COP=Colombian pesos. The average exchange rate in March 2009 was 2,477.21 COP/USD. For 2009, the 
IMF reported an implied PPP conversion rate of 1,226.41.  
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Every decrease of the low value by 1,000 COP means an increase of the high value by 
3,000 COP. Notice that the exception is between bags seven and eight that have the same 
expected value but bag eight has greater variability, so if someone chooses bag eight over 
bag seven, this would signify risk neutrality or risk attraction. 
The highest possible gain of 118,000 COP (96 USD in PPP
23) was around 23% of 
participants’ average income and 24% of the monthly minimum wage. For the average 
household of 5 people, this payment amounted to around 16% of the proposed reference 
point.   
B.  Data analysis 
We use an analysis of a Regression Discontinuity Design wherein, if there is a treatment (in 
this case,being undernourished and having the opportunity to escape that state) which is 
determined by a critical value ofa single variable (in this case income) then if all the other 
variables do not change around the critical value, any change in a dependent variable (in 
this case risk aversion) can be explained by the incidence of the treatment. 
1.  Methodological approach: The Regression Discontinuity Design (RD) 
RD has proven to be a very robust estimation strategy of treatment effects for non-
experimental settings when the treatment depends on an enforcing variable that cannot be 
perfectly controlled. Furthermore, under certain feasible conditions, its internal validity has 
proven to be very high.
24 It is based on the assumption that those individuals nearest the 
reference—the fact of whichdetermines participation in the treatment—are very similar. In 
thisway, it determines the effect of a treatment—which is determined by the value of a 
single variable—around the critical value. This allows us to estimate the differences in risk 
aversion between those to the left and near to the reference of the income necessary to 
avoid undernourishment and those to the right and near to the reference. 
We use the RD module for stata,
25 and chose to go with the default kernel of the Local 
Linear Regression, inasmuch as for RD, it has proven to be the most reliable kernel.
26 
                                                 
23Using the IMF World Economic Outlook Database, April 2009. 
24For a “user guide” of the Regression Discontinuity Design, and the necessary conditions for using it, please 
refer to Lee and Lemieux (2009). 
25Nichols, Austin, 2007. RD: stata module for regression discontinuity estimation. 
26Lee and Lemieux (2009) note that “the choice of kernel typically has little impact in practice.”  
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We checked for all the sufficient conditions presented by Lee and Lemieux (2009). In this 
case, we have a continuous enforcing variable—that is,income—and a variable that 
presents a jump in the determined reference—risk aversion—with an inability to perfectly 
control the enforcing variable. The only condition that presentsany problems is the 
continuity in the density of the enforcing variable around the reference. After analyzing the 
potential problems it presents, we found that this was not a sign of manipulation over the 
enforcing variable, but solely a problem of the sample that was more concentrated in the 
left side of the distribution. Data from the Bogota’s Life Quality Survey (2007) was 
revised, on the basis of which, we found that this variable has uniform density around the 
reference. 
a)  Determining the reference 
The reference is confirmed in two manners. First, we evaluate graphically the incidence of 
undernourishment and its relationship to per-capita income (see Figure 9); second, we 
depart from the theoretical construct, reaching two very close values. In the second 
approach, in order to determine the reference value—in this case, of the minimum income 
needed to buy the minimum food requirements—in terms of per capita income, we use the 
value of the extreme poverty line (the price of a food basket providing 2,100 calories and 
basic vitamins that takes into account tastes and what food is available) calculated for 
Colombia in 2005 by the DepartamentoNacional de Planeación (hereafter, DNP). 
However, we have to be very careful not to restrict the value of the reference only to the 
value of this basket, as it has been shown that even extremely poor households do not spend 
all of their money on food as presented by BD.  The value of this line was calculated by the 
DNP in 2005 for September 2004 as COP 88,243 for an urban householdfrom Bogota, of 
an average size of 4,45 members. We then take this value and use the food inflation rate for 
the poor in Bogota
27 to derive the value of the basket for March 2009. The resulting value is 
COP 124,000. After that, and taking into account that, even the poorest households do not 
use all of their income for food, we use the percentage of the budget used for food by 
households in Soacha(The locality in Bogota’s Life Quality Survey [DANE 2007], with 
                                                 
27 This inflation rate is available monthly on the website for the Colombian National Statistics Bureau 
(DANE), at www.dane.gov.co.  
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characteristics closer to those in these neighborhoods),79%, to determine the expanded 
value of COP, which is 157.000.  
Even if this is the actual reference, we have to consider that in this exercise, choosing any 
of the first three options (i.e., modal responses from those far from the reference) could 
change the probability of treatment for those very near the reference without the need of 
bearing any extra risks. Because of this, we subtract the high payment for the third option 
from the expanded value, and find the reference point to be COP 148.000. Figure 12 shows 
the incidence of undernourishment according to the per capita income, and shows that the 
probability decreases significantly at this level of per capita income.  
 
2.  Econometric estimation 
First, we do the estimation giving an order to the options according to the risk involved. 
We find that the difference in the chosen options around the referenceis significant (See 
Figure 11a andTable 4.) However, this approach does not capture the difference that exists 
when choosing between options 1 and 2 or options 7 and 8. According to this, it would be 
best to use a measure of risk aversion. One shortcoming ofBinswager’sexperimental design 
is that it does not provide the possibility of determining the exact value of the risk aversion, 
but only of an interval of it.  
We thus utilize the widely used CRRA utility,U(x) = x
(1−r)/(1−r). This allows us to compare 
our results with those of other papers,in order to determine the values that would make an 
individual neutral with respect to any two consecutive options. We then propose a method 
for making estimations, based on which we impute for each decision a risk aversion 
parameter that is the average between the high value and the low value of the interval. In 
the case of the first and the last options, we were not able to follow this procedure, as we 
only had one value for the interval, the inner value; for these cases, we imputed the value of 
the inner range (see Table 2). Even though it was anticipated that imputing the extreme 
options would most likely bias the estimation, we only expected it to underestimate the 
impact of the treatment. In this way, we could either drop these observations, or keep the 
inner values as we proposed. 
In the literature, it has been found that, conventionally speaking, risk aversion can be 
partially explained by various variables; in order to control for these variables, and  
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following Lee and Lemieux (2009),we first run a regression of risk aversion over the 
control variables of sex, age and age squared (see Table 3). We then run the RD design 
over the unexplained portion of the risk aversion.  
With an assumed reference pointofZ=148000, we find alocal waldestimate for the jump of 
5.207888 (see Table 4). This is the difference in risk aversion between those near-above 
and near-below the reference.  
Because the stata module for RD assumes that the treatment is 0 before the jump and 1 after 
it, we interpret the results of the difference on risk aversion as the effect of being near the 
jump and above relative to those below. Table 4 presents the results of bootstrapping the 
method;we find that the effect is significant at a 95% confidence level.
28 This behavior is 
consistent with the example developed in section III. Being below and near the reference 
means that, wheneverpresented with an option to go above the reference, one will take 
higher risks. 
VI.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This paper has developed a model that explains a mechanism by which the poor can be 
affected by an income reference related to subsistence, such that the seemingly inconsistent 
behaviors that have been seen in the poor may in fact reflect “revealed incentivized 
preferences” instead of “revealed inherent preferences.” 
 
Some of the decisions we make may have consequences in our future, and we take these 
consequences into account. In the case of the extremely poor, these consequences could be 
different life expectancies. This is because subsistence is on the market. With the inclusion 
of the possibility that, the outcome of present decisions may affect future access to 
consumption, we are able to maintain a single exponential discount rate as well as the 
desired characteristics of EU, and still model referenced behaviors and loss aversion. 
 
The evidence found in a field experiment suggests that extremely poor individuals are able 
to identify the income necessary to avoid undernourishment; additionally, it shows that 
                                                 
28There seem to be a slight sensibility to the bandwidth chosen by the module, but only if we double or half 
the default bandwidth.  
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individuals modify their behavior whenever facing the possibility of going from one side of 
the reference to the other. A special case of interest is that of inherently risk-averse 
households choosing, due to incentives, to become risk lovers. In such a way, we are able to 
complement Fafchamps’ statement so as to say that, if faced with the choice between 
avoiding risknow and only gaining an income that provides only the possibility of being 
undernourished,versus investing time in a risky activity such as crop production, risk averse 
households will naturally choose to take risks and produce.  
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ANNEX I.  Figures 
Figure 1.  The utility function dependent on wealth, from Friedman & Savage (1948) 
 
Source: Friedman and Savage (1948), p. 295. 
Figure 2.  The Markowitz utility function around current wealth with three inflection 
points 
 
Source: Markowitz (1952), p. 154. 
Figure 3.  Prospect theory 
 
Source: KahnemanandTversky (1979), p.279. 
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Figure 9.  Incidence of undernourishment versusper capita income around 157,000 
 
Source: Author’s.Notes: lines represent per capita incomes of 148.000 and 157.000 COP. 
 
Figure 10.  RD: unexplained variance 
 
 
Source: Author’s. Notes: The zero corresponds to aper capita income of 148.000 COP. In the ordered options, 
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ANNEX II.  Tables 
Table 1.  Descriptive statistics of households (HH) 
Variable N  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
HH members  89  5.04  2.29  2   16 
HH members aged 15-64  89  2.34  1.32  0   9 
Age of participant  87  36.97  12.84  16   68 
Missed meals per-capita during the last 
week (maximum 21) 
89 1.74 3.35 0 16
Years of education: HH members aged 
15-64  88 6.76 3.03 0    13 
HH monthly income in COP  89  507,157 298,176  20,000   1,800,000 
HH per-capita monthly income in COP 89  110,839  69,538 6,667   375,000 





Missed at least one meal 
during the last week 
34%
*A private closed space is considered a house. Some of these houses are in fact very precarious constructions. 
Table 2.  Risk aversion parameters used in the estimation 
 
Source: Author’s.   
Lower limit Higher limit
1 32.000          32.000         32.000         9,99 9,99
2 30.000          38.000         34.000         2,79 9,99 6,39
3 27.000          47.000         37.000         1,47 2,79 2,13
4 23.000          59.000         41.000         0,93 1,47 1,20
5 18.000          74.000         46.000         0,64 0,93 0,79
6 12.000          92.000         52.000         0,43 0,64 0,54
7 5.000           113.000        59.000         0,00 0,43 0,22









Table 3.  Regressions over controls 
   Base risk  Base risk 
VARIABLES (orderedoptions)  (riskaversion) 
        
Age -0.132  0.357* 
 (0.0994)  (0.184) 
Female -0.331 0.126 
 (0.570)  (1.053) 
Age-squared 0.00155  -0.00424* 
 (0.00117)  (0.00216) 
Constant 6.050***  -2.650 
 (1.897)  (3.501) 
    
Observations 87 87 
R-squared 0.030  0.048 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 4.  RD estimation, bootstraped 1,000 times to estimate standard errors 
   Base risk  Base risk 
   (orderedoptions) (riskaversion) 
    
lwald -3.080**  5.222** 
 (1.448)  (2.247) 
lwald50 -4.613  6.816 
 (8.407)  (24.16) 
lwald75 -3.397  5.702* 
 (2.207)  (3.001) 
lwald125 -2.379**  3.430 
 (1.211)  (2.127) 
lwald150 -1.648  2.020 
 (1.087)  (2.013) 
    
Observations 87 87 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Note: lwaldX estimates the jump using the alternative bandwidths used to test robustness. X is the percentage 
at the normal bandwidth. This table demonstrates that the jump is significant at a bandwidth of 75% of the 
normal one.  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 